Key findings

• The first half of 2025, or “2025 H1″ saw the highest BRI engagement ever for any 6-month period, with USD 66.2 billion in construction contracts and about USD 57.1 billion in investments;
• China’s energy related engagement in 2025 were the highest in any period since the BRI’s inceptionreaching USD42 billion, an increase of 100% compared to 2024 H1;
• Oil and gas engagement surged to record highs of about USD30 billion, higher than in all of 2024, particularly through oil/gas processing facilities construction contracts in the Nigeria (USD 20 billion);
• Green energy engagement reached new records with USD 9.7 billion in wind, solar, and waste-to-energy projects and an installed capacity of about 11.9 GW of green energy;
• China continued to invest in coal-related activities through various construction of coal mine infrastructure;
• Metals and mining sector reached new records surpassing the full year of 2024 (which itself was a record year) in the first 6 months of 2025 with about USD 24.9 billion – mostly through investments and in minerals processing (about USD 10 billion into mining);
• The technology and manufacturing also broke records and reached almost USD 23.2 billion with high-tech engagements in solar PV, EV batteries and in hydrogen (in Nigeria);
• Africa and Central Asia topped the rank of BRI engagement, reaching USD 39 and USD 25 billion, respectively (unseating Middle East).
• BRI investments in 2025 were driven by private sector companies, dominated by East Hope Group, Xinfa Group and Longi Green Energy.
• Since its establishment in 2013, cumulative BRI engagement reached USD 1.308 trillion, with about USD 775 billion in construction contracts, and USD 533 billion in non-financial investments;

• For the rest of 2025, we see stabilization of Chinese BRI engagement with a focus on BRI engagement in renewable energy, mining and new technologies;
• Global trade and investment volatility will potentially spur further investment for supply chain resilience and alternative export markets for Chinese companies
• Potential future engagements remain in six project types: manufacturing in new technologies (e.g., batteries), renewable energy, trade-enabling infrastructure (including pipelines, roads), ICT (e.g., data centers), resource-backed deals (e.g., mining, oil, gas), high visibility or strategic projects (e.g., railway, ports).

China’s engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative in 2025 H1

Preliminary data on Chinese engagement in the 150 countries of the Belt and Road Initiative through investments and construction contracts show record levels of engagement worth USD 66.2 billion in construction contracts and USD 57.1 billion in investments for the first six months of 2025. This is almost twice the value of the first six months of the previous record in 2024.

This equals to a total engagement of USD 124 billion through construction contracts and investments in about 176 deals in H1 2025. This compares to USD 122 billion BRI engagement in all of 2024 (see Figure 1). For comparison reasons: if only including deals larger than USD 100 million as was done before 2024, construction engagement would be USD 64.2 billion and investments would be 58.4 billion USD, with a total engagement of 122.6 billion – a minor difference.

Cumulatively, Chinese BRI engagement has reached USD 1.308 trillion since 2013 of which USD 775 billion in construction and USD 533 billion in investments.

About the data In May 2025, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released new BRI engagement statistics covering the period of January to April 2024. According to these data, Chinese enterprises invested about USD12.8 billion in non-financial direct investments in Belt and Road partner. At the same time, the value of newly-signed project contracts by Chinese enterprises in Belt and Road partner countries was USD64.5 billion. For this report, we define BRI engagements as those Chinese construction and investment deals in countries that had we identify as having an MoU with China to cooperate under the BRI at the time of the report. To stay consistent with data over time and avoid an inflation/deflation of the  value of BRI engagement across time simply by adding/subtracting countries, we count current BRI members (i.e., members in 2025) no matter when they signed the MoU (thus, if the Syrian Republic signed a BRI MoU in 2022, we also count prior investments into Syria as BRI investments) or exited (i.e., if Italy exited the BRI in 2023 we exclude Italy from the BRI country list and Chinese engagement in Italy is not counted). The definition of BRI countries thus includes 150 countries that had signed a cooperation agreement with China to work under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by July 2025. Our data until 2023 were reliant on and significantly expanded from the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT), published by the American Enterprise Institute. Starting with data for 2024, we follow a rigorous independent collection process where we include projects with validated credible sources or two independent sources. We include projects with a signed contract for implementation or clear announcements of investments (e.g., stock market announcements). We more consistently include projects from about USD20 million, rather than projects with at least USD100 million in volume in the CGIT. Where we see that this inclusion might lead to different data interpretation, we included a separate calculation. As with most data, they tend to be imperfect and need regular updating.

Share of investments in China’s BRI increases despite high valued construction contracts

The share of Chinese engagement in the BRI through investments compared to construction increased compared to 2024 and reached about 46% – the second highest level on record. This compares to 54% share of construction contracts that are typically financed through loans provided by Chinese financial institutions and/or contractors with the project often receiving guarantees through the host country’s government institutions potentially backed up by resources (e.g., oil, gas) (see Fig 2).

Deal sizes are at record high levels for both investments and construction

The average deal size for investments with a value larger than USD 100 million grew to record levels of USD 1.243 billion in 2025 (from USD 672 million in 2024). These are values two to three times higher than in the past 10 years. If all deal sizes including those smaller than USD100 million are included, the deal size for investment was USD864 million and USD 499 million for construction contracts. For comparison reasons with slightly different data collection approaches since 2024, we focus on deal size larger than USD100 million in this analysis.

For construction projects, the average deal size in 2025 increased to USD 783 million, up from USD 498 million in 2024 (see Fig 3).

Both developments are driven by single large projects, such as a USD 20 billion construction project in Nigeria and two investment projects valued at more than USD 5 billion, both in Kazakhstan.

This development is bucking the ambition to have “small yet beautiful projects” in the BRI propagated through official channels. However, it is important to note (as seen later in the report) that most large infrastructure projects are resource-backed deals (e.g., oil, gas) rather than fiscal spending deals (e.g., road construction), with relatively low financial risks for Chinese counterparts.

Regional and country analysis of Chinese BRI engagement

Africa and Central Asia receive more in H1 2025 than in any previous period

Chinese BRI engagement was not evenly distributed among all regions. China’s construction engagement across multiple regions declined (e.g., East Asia, Europe, Middle East, Pacific) compared to the first half of 2024, while others expanded significantly (e.g., Africa plus 395%) or Pacific (Central Asia, plus 69%).

The region with the absolute largest construction engagement was Africa reaching USD 30.5 billion in the first half of 2025, compared to USD 6.1 billion in the first half of 2024. Middle East came in second with USD 19.4 billion in engagement.

For investment, most regions saw an increase in investment (except Southeast Asia and Latin America). Others saw significant increases, particularly Europe (plus 2,145%) and Central Asia (plus 257%) with total engagements of USD 3.5 billion and USD 24.3 billion respectively. Central Asia was also the region with the highest absolute investment volume in H1 2025 followed by Southeast Asia with USD 11.3 billion in Chinese investment (see Fig 3)

Latin American BRI countries continue to see low Chinese engagement remaining at the lowest values in the past 10 years for investment and construction.

China’s financing and investment spread across 69 BRI countries in 2025 H1 (up from 67 in 2024 H1), with 43 countries receiving investments and 53 with construction engagement.

The country with the highest construction volume in 2025 H1 was Nigeria with about USD21 billion (up from 206 million in 2024 H1), followed by Saudi Arabia (USD 7.2 billion), UAE (USD 7 billion), Tanzania (USD 3.6 billion), and Indonesia (about USD 2.1 billion).

Regarding BRI investments, Kazakhstan was the single largest recipient with about USD 23 billion in investments in 2025 H1, followed Thailand (USD 7.4 billion), and Egypt (USD 4.8 billion).

16 countries saw a 100% drop of BRI engagement compared to 2024 H1, including Cameroon, Bulgaria, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and South Africa. China’s engagement in Pakistan for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) dropped by 54%, after dropping about 40% from 2023 to 2024 (see Error! Reference source not found.).

The countries with the largest growth of BRI engagement were Nigeria (+12,235 %), Thailand (+2,373%), Lao (+2,030%), Tanzania (+1,930%), and Oman (+1,718%).

Like in the year 2022 (the year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), Russia did not receive any Chinese engagement in H1 2025.

Sector trends of BRI engagement

In 2025 H1, particularly the energy sector (+ USD 20.9 billion), metals & mining (+14.7 billion) and the technology sectors (+USD 9.9 billion) grew compared to 2024 H1. The focus of China’s overseas BRI engagement continued to be in energy (35%). Compared to early years of the BRI, the transport sector dropped to its lowest level of only 7.2% share of BRI engagement (compared to e.g., 28% in 2018 and 17.7% in 2023). Meanwhile, the metals and mining sector continued to expand its role as the second largest sector with about 20%, while the share of the technology sector contracted slightly to 13.3% (despite an absolute growth) (see Fig 6).

When comparing construction and investment in different sectors, it becomes clear that in mining and technology, Chinese firms are increasingly prioritizing equity investments, despite the higher risks involved; meanwhile, energy investments continue to be dominated by construction deals rather than equity-based investments (see Fig 7).

Technology and manufacturing have emerged as key growth sectors, with Chinese engagement in BRI countries more than doubling compared to 2024 H1 to USD 23.2 billion. The investment is mainly focused on EV batteries and EV manufacturing, as well as significant engagement by Longi in green hydrogen development in Nigeria (se Fig 8). Other notable engagements include a USD 2.1 billion investments by China Aviation Lithium Battery (CALB) in a lithium battery factory in Portugal or a USD 700 million solar PV glass production base in Egypt by Xinyi Glass Holding.

Another important growth sector of strategic importance to China is metals and mining, where China’s engagement reached a record high of USD 24.9 billion in H1 2025 alone, more than any previous full year since 2013. Kazakhstan saw most important engagement through – USD 12 billion in aluminum and another 7.5 billion in copper. Compared to previous years, little Chinese engagement was seen in Indonesia, except for an aluminum-related investment. It is important to note that in 2025, the share of mining compared to processing facilities (e.g., smelters) was about 60%, with 40% of the investment (about USD 10 billion) went to exploitation related activities (see Fig 9).

Energy-related engagement in the BRI at highest levels ever recorded – with increase in absolute green, but faster increase in gas

China’s energy–related engagement in 2025 H1 again set a record as the greenest since the BRI’s inception in 2013: in 2025 H1, China’s energy engagement was about USD44 billion, more than in the previous full record year 2024.

China’s engagement in green energy has also seen the highest H1 since 2013 – with USD 9.7 billion in wind, solar, and waste-to-energy.

China also expanded its engagement in fossil fuels, particularly gas, but also coal (through coal mining). Engagement in distribution systems (e.g., substations, power lines) constituted more than 4.5% of Chinese BRI energy engagement (see Fig 10).

Coal

Following China’s announcement in September 2021 to not to build new coal fired power plants, select new coal-fired power projects seem to progress (e.g., Bangladesh Barisal 2, Gacko II in Bosnia).

While no new coal plants with Chinese participation had been announced since 2021, 2025 saw a continued engagement in coal-related engagement through mining operations. PowerChina was engaged in several projects in Mongolia and China Railway in Indonesia (all through construction contracts). Altogether, over USD 1.58 billion in contracts for coal-related activities were identified.

Oil and gas

Oil and gas engagement rose significantly to over USD 30 billion in just the first half of 2025 (up from to USD 24 billion in all of 2024), constituting almost 70% of Chinese overseas energy engagement, with USD23.3 billion in gas and 6.9 USD billion in oil.

As for investments, a major deal was the USD 3.7 billion investment by Sinopec in Sri Lanka to build an oil refinery.

Meanwhile, all gas-related projects were related to construction projects, such as the USD 20 billion Ogidibgon Gas Revolution Park in Nigeria and the USD 1.6 billion engagement by Harbin Electric in Saudi Arabia for a gas fired power plant.

Green energy/hydropower

China’s total engagement in green energy (solar and wind) and hydropower reached approximately USD9.7 billion in 2025 H1, up from USD5.5 billion in 2024 H1.

Looking at investment only, Chinese green energy and hydropower investment increased to USD3.1 billion in 2025 H1, up from USD1.3 billion in 2024 H1. Meanwhile, construction projects related to green energy (including hydropower) increased from USD4.4 billion in 2024 H1 to USD5.7 billion in 2025 H1 (see Fig 11).

Green energy sources varied In 2025 H1, a more detailed analysis of green energy sources revealed that China is engaging in a diverse range of energy projects. While solar and wind play absolutely a growing role, in H1 2025 the majority was fossil fuel related engagement with 53% gas, 16% oil, and 3.6% coal related engagement (see Fig 12).

Energy engagement across the supply chain Since 2022, China’s engagement across the energy supply chain has evolved significantly. While energy generation remained the primary focus in both 2022 and 2023, 2024 saw a resurgence of fossil fuel processing facilities (USD 17.1 billion) and pipeline projects (USD 4.6 billion). Meanwhile, in H1 2025 energy exploitation became significantly more important again with a focus on oil, gas and coal-related activities (see Fig 13).

Looking at generation capacity only, Chinese engagement in H1 2025 almost reaches the same total level as in all of 2024, with an addition of about 15 GW of generation capacity: 4.9 GW in solar, 4.4 GW in wind, and 3.6 GW in gas projects (see Fig 14)

Energy engagement in different countries

An analysis of China’s energy engagement across BRI countries in 2025 H1 reveals that Nigeria is the country with the highest Chinese energy engagement, driven by nearly USD 20 billion of construction contracts in the Ogidigbon Gas Revolution Industrial Park by China National Chemical Engineering. Sri Lanka was the second largest recipient of Chinese BRI energy engagement based on a USD 3.7 billion oil refinery construction deal signed in 2025 (see Fig 15).

Since 2013, Saudi Arabia remains the country with the highest Chinese energy engagement with about USD 35.5 billion followed by Pakistan (USD 28.8 billion), Iraq (USD 27.9 billion) and Nigeria (USD 27.2 billion).

Similarly, since 2013, oil engagement topped gas engagement with USD 121 billion and USD 110 billion respectively. Solar and wind engagement is now equal to coal with each about USD 63 billion (hydro has about USD 68 billion).

Transport engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative

Transport-related engagement has long been a cornerstone of facilitating trade between China and the BRI countries, and trade is a core component of the BRI. To support this, China has invested in and developed projects in road, rail, aviation, shipping, and logistics across the world (see Error! Reference source not found.). Overall, China’s engagement in transport-related projects remained stable at about USD15 billion (despite a decreasing share due to overall larger volumes) – almost exclusively through construction contracts. This figure represents about half the volume seen during the peak years of 2018 and 2019,

Aviation: One project was announced totaling USD152 million, which is the Punta Verte International Airport in Nicaragua.

Rail: Total rail engagement (including light rail and subway) was worth USD5.7 billion, where particularly the expansion of the Standard Gauge Railway in Tanzania stands out with involvement from China Railway Group Limited (CREC) and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC). In Mexico, China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation (CRRC) won the bid to supply 17 electric units for a light rail in Mexico City.

Road transport: China continues to engage in road construction projects across multiple BRI countries, with a total value of USD 1.7 billion in 2025 H1. However, this marks the lowest volume of road-related engagement in BRI history.  Outside the BRI, China engaged in a road project worth USD 2.5 billion in Australia (the Adelaide Ringroad) and a USD 423 million project in India.Ports: No shipping project was found in the H1 2025 in BRI countries, and one in Brazil for the acquisition of VAST Infra-crude oil port operator by China Merchants Group valued at USD 448 million.

Major players in BRI investments

In 2025 H1, Chinese private enterprises reclaimed a dominant role in investment from private enterprises, reversing the trend of the last year.

For investment projects, East Hope Group and Xinfa Group led ahead of Longi Green Energy and Bytedance (all private companies). Sinopec, a state-owned enterprise, ranked fifth. The Chinese companies most prominently featured in construction projects in the BRI in 2024 was China National Chemical Engineering and followed by the leader in previous years PowerChina (again). Construction projects are all dominated by Chinese state-owned enterprises (see Tab 1).

China’s BRI investments in a global comparison

Latest reliable data on FDI in emerging economies encompasses all of 2024 published by UNCTAD in June 2025. The report highlights that in 2024 foreign direct investments (FDI) to developing countries rose slightly by 0.2% to USD 867 billion (compared to USD 8865 billion in 2023). Particularly developing countries in Africa was a significant rise (from USD 55 to USD 97 billion), while developing Asia saw a drop of 3% (from USD 622 to USD 605 billion).  

Compared to trends reported in this report, UNCTAD reports a 51% decline in extractive investment, compared to a 107% increase in digital economy investments (for all countries). 

Investments in SDG-related projects (e.g., agrifood, water, sanitation) fell sharply globally in 2024, except for health and education.

Looking ahead, UNCTAD expects a moderate increase in FDI flows in 2025 with moderate inflation and tempered borrowing cost. However, geopolitical risks, and high debt levels remain a concern for global FDI flows, particularly with high uncertainty about the US trade and investment politics.

Outlook for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Finance and Investments

Chinese finance and investments into the Belt and Road Initiative countries in 2025 H1 have accelerated significantly.

For 2025, a further expansion of BRI investments and construction contracts seems possible despite (or because of) global economic headwinds driven by US-led trade impositions. On the one hand, there is clear need for investments to green boost growth to support the green transition both in China and in BRI countries. This provides continued opportunities for mining and minerals processing deals, technology deals (e.g., EV manufacturing, battery manufacturing) and green energy (e.g., energy production and transmission). China refers to these industries (electric vehicles, batteries and renewable energy) as the “New Three”.

Furthermore, global trade volatilities and uncertainties can spur investments in supply chain resilience and exploration of new markets by Chinese companies. However, risks emerge due to uncertainty of possible activities by global financial institutions with strong US board presence (e.g., World Bank Group, Asian Development Bank), while China dominated development banks (e.g., AIIB, NDB) should provide infrastructure development opportunities for Chinese contractors.

Nevertheless, we do expect Chinese BRI engagement to reach lower levels in the second half of 2025 with fewer megadeals. In line with our previous predictions, we continue to see deal numbers increasing. With strong engagement in sectors requiring significant investment (e.g., mining, manufacturing), compared to sectors with variable engagement (e.g., renewable energy), we can expect deal size to also remain larger than in 2022 and 2023.

About our partner Griffith Asia Institute

Griffith Asia Institute (GAI) at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, is an internationally recognized institute providing knowledge, and solutions for sustainable development in Asia-Pacific. With a history of over 20 years, GAI has forged strong partnerships with key decision-makers in business, policy and with research institutions across the region. With over 80 faculty members and 50 adjunct members, GAI works in multidisciplinary teams and draws on a wide range of technical expertise in energy, finance, policy, economics as well as in regional studies including a strong China component (https://www.griffith.edu.au/asia-institute).

GAI is organized in knowledge and regional hubs:

• The Green Transition and Sustainable Development Hub addresses major challenges and opportunities for Asian and Pacific economies in addressing SDGs related to climate, life on land, life in the sea, partnerships, infrastructure and energy.  
• The Governance and Diplomacy Hub addresses major challenges and opportunities in the region for peaceful co-existence, diplomacy, inclusive governance, policymaking and institution building.
• The Inclusive Growth and Rural Development Hub addresses major challenges and opportunities in the region regarding currently underserved communities (eg, women, indigenous, youth, rural, or people with disabilities).  
• The four regional hubs address major regional and country-specific challenges and opportunities in (1) Southeast Asia, (2) South Asia, (3) Pacific and (4) China and the Region, each with their own hub lead.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries by region

The following BRI map shows the list of countries that have signed MoUs or are said to be members of the BRI by region used in this report.